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This study examines the effects of changes in management earnings forecast 
precision (i.e., changes in the width of the forecast range) and investor preferences 
on investor judgments.  In general, prior research finds that more precise 
management forecasts are more credible than less precise management forecasts 
(e.g., Baginski et al. 1993).  Nevertheless, when economic uncertainty is high, 
investors do not prefer very precise forecasts over less precise forecasts (Du et al. 
2011).  Based on the concept of credibility from Mercer (2005) and motivated 
reasoning theory from Kunda (1990), I predict that investors’ reactions to changes 
in forecast specificity will be based on their preferences for firm performance.  
Specifically, I predict that investors holding a long position will judge management 
to be more competent when the forecast range narrows, but more trustworthy when 
the forecast range widens.  In contrast, I predict that investors holding a short 
position will judge management to be less trustworthy when the forecast range 
narrows, but less competent when the forecast range widens.  I use an experiment to 
test these predictions.  While results do not support the predictions above, I do find 
evidence that: (1) changes in forecast specificity affect investors’ judgments of 
economic uncertainty, and (2) investors’ perceptions of managerial trustworthiness 
and competence have predictable consequences for firm management.  Specifically, 
in regard to the former, I find that investors perceive the greatest increase in 
economic uncertainty when holding a long position and the forecast range widens; 
conversely, I find that investors perceive a decrease in economic uncertainty when 
holding a short position and the forecast range narrows.  In regard to the 
ix 
 
consequences of managerial credibility, I find investors’ belief that the manager is 
manipulating earnings is decreasing in perceived managerial trustworthiness. In 
addition, I find that investors’ willingness to retain the CEO is increasing in 
perceived managerial competence, but, after controlling for perceived managerial 
competence, investors’ decision to retain the CEO is not reliably related to 







CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
This study examines how changes in management earnings forecast (MF) 
precision combines with investors’ preferences for firm performance to impact 
perceived managerial credibility.  Management earnings forecasts are important 
voluntary disclosures and are the subject of much attention in the accounting 
literature (Healy and Palepu 2001).1  For example, Beyer et al. (2010) find that MF 
provide over half of the accounting-based information used by the stock market; that 
is, MF explain more quarterly stock market return variance than do earnings 
announcements, earnings preannouncements, analysts forecasts, and SEC filings 
combined.  Further, MF are of continuing interest to accounting researchers because 
of the extensive variation in forecast characteristics, and because relatively subtle 
differences in earnings forecast characteristics can be important to investors (e.g., 
Jensen and Plumlee 2013; Hirst et al. 2008; Mercer 2004).   
Prior research on MF precision usually compares point versus range 
forecasts (e.g., Pownall et al. 1993; Baginski and Hassell 1997; Hirst et al. 1999) 
and narrow versus wide range forecasts (e.g., Libby et al. 2006).  In contrast, there 
is little research on the effects of changes in forecast precision over time.2  
Nevertheless, managers can and do change earnings forecast precision, as is 
depicted by the following news excerpt:  
                                                            
1 Management earnings forecasts are management’s prediction of earnings that are released prior to 
the earnings announcement date (King et al. 1990).  These forecasts are distinct from earnings 
preannouncements, which are the disclosure of tentative earnings made shortly before the formal 
earnings announcement (Soffer et al. 2000). 
2 One exception is a working paper by Jensen and Plumlee (2013) that examines changes in forecast 





Procter & Gamble Co. gave a wider-than-normal outlook for the coming year, 
reflecting broad uncertainty due to global economic jitters, another big increase in 
commodity costs and whether price increases will stick entirely.  (Ziobro 2011) 
In this study, I employ theories from two areas of accounting and 
psychology research to examine the effects of changes in management earnings 
forecast precision.  The first theory I employ is motivated reasoning theory from 
social psychology (Kunda 1990).  Motivated reasoning theory predicts that decision 
makers process information in a manner that is consistent with their preferences.  
Recent research in accounting indicates that investors engage in motivated 
reasoning, even when they have economic incentives to objectively process 
information (e.g., Hales 2007; Han and Tan 2010).  For instance, Hales (2007) finds 
that investors are motivated to agree with information that indicates they will make 
money on their investment and disagree with information that suggests they will 
lose money on their investment.  In general, studies such as Han and Tan (2010) and 
Hales (2007) operationalize directional preferences by comparing investors who are 
“long” a stock to investors who are “short” a stock.  Investors hold a long position 
in a stock when they purchase the stock before selling it; in contrast, investors hold 
a short position in a stock when they borrow the stock, sell it to another investor, 
and then purchase the stock at a later date.  Therefore, investors who are long a 
stock profit when the company’s stock performs well (because they purchase the 
stock before selling it); in contrast, investors who are short a stock profit when a 
company’s stock performs poorly (because they purchase the stock after they sell 





interpret information about the company optimistically (in terms of company 
performance) and investors who are short a stock interpret information about the 
company pessimistically (in terms of company performance) (Hales 2007; Han and 
Tan 2010).3  On the whole, these studies support a growing body of research in 
behavioral economics that indicates investor sentiment affects market participants’ 
interpretation of economic information (Akerlof and Shiller 2009).      
The second theory I employ is managerial credibility.4  Perceived credibility 
contains two components: beliefs about management’s trustworthiness and beliefs 
about management’s competence (Mercer 2005; Hovland et al. 1953; Giffin 1967).5  
As such, decision makers’ judgments about managerial credibility are driven by 
their beliefs about management’s trustworthiness, competence or both.  
Nevertheless, current accounting research has only focused on the overall concept of 
perceived credibility rather than on the subcomponents of trustworthiness and 
competence (e.g., Hirst et al. 1999; Hirst et al. 2007; Mercer 2005).6  In this study, I 
develop specific predictions about how perceptions of managerial competence and 
trustworthiness are affected by changes in earnings forecast precision, depending on 
investors’ preference for company performance. 
                                                            
3 Note that a number of auditing and tax studies investigate motivated reasoning in different contexts 
(Bonner 2008). 
4 Attribution theory (e.g., Kelley 1967; Weiner 1992), whereby investors make internal or external 
attributions regarding voluntary disclosures, provides an alternative framework for investigating MF.  
However, in the current study I develop hypotheses based on the theories of motivated reasoning and 
managerial credibility.        
5 Mercer (2005) defines managerial reporting credibility as “investors’ beliefs about management’s 
trustworthiness and competence in financial disclosure.”  In this paper I adapt Mercer’s (2005) 
definition to encompass overall managerial credibility.  Further, as in Mercer (2005), I define 
managerial credibility as determined by investors’ perception rather than a “true” (but unobservable) 
underlying credibility.      
6 Although prior research measures trustworthiness and competence (e.g., Mercer 2005) these studies 





Corporate managers emphasize the importance of developing a track record 
of credibility (Graham et al. 2005), but the implications of forecast precision on 
credibility are uncertain.  Several studies find that more precise earnings forecasts 
are perceived by investors as more credible (e.g., Baginski et al. 1993; Hirst et al. 
1999).  Nevertheless, disclosing precise forecasts is inherently risky in that it 
increases the chance of missing the forecast (Mercer 2004).  I posit that investors 
are aware of this inherent tension, and that investors’ directional preferences (e.g., 
due to long or short positions) lead them to interpret changes in management 
earnings guidance precision in accordance with their motivational preferences—in 
other words, I expect investors with a long position to interpret changes in forecast 
precision optimistically (in terms of company performance) and investors with a 
short position to interpret changes in forecast precision pessimistically (in terms of 
company performance).  However, I expect that these relations are not direct, but 
are caused by changes in the underlying components of credibility—trustworthiness 
and competence.        
In particular, I predict that in the case where management widens the 
forecast range from the prior period, investors with a long position will 
(optimistically) perceive management as more credible because they are more 
trustworthy than previously; conversely, I predict that investors with a short position 
will (pessimistically) perceive management as less credible because they are less 
competent than previously.  I expect the opposite relations in the case where 
management narrows the forecast range from the prior period.  In particular, I 





as more credible because they are more competent than previously; conversely, I 
predict that investors with a short position will (pessimistically) perceive 
management as less credible because they are less trustworthy than previously.7 
I use an experiment to test these predictions.  Although theoretical and 
empirical-archival research on management earnings guidance precision is possible 
(see, e.g., Baginski et al. 1993; Rogers and Stocken 2005; Pownall et al. 1993; 
Jensen and Plumlee 2013), an experiment allows me to hold constant factors such as 
actual earnings realizations and other features of the information environment.  In 
addition, investors’ judgments of competence, trustworthiness, and credibility are 
not available in archival databases.  Therefore, an experiment is necessary to test my 
predictions. 
Overall, results do not support my predictions regarding changes in 
managerial credibility.  Consistent with prior research, I find that the two 
components of managerial credibility (trustworthiness and competence) seem to 
measure the same construct—a result that is inconsistent with my predictions. In 
addition, I find small, positive changes in perceived credibility for investors holding 
a short position, and small, negative changes in perceived credibility for investors 
holding a long position.  Investors holding a long (short) position reported initial 
perceptions of managerial credibility that were relatively high (low).  Therefore, my 
main results may be driven by mean reversion rather than motivated reasoning. 
In addition to my hypotheses related to credibility, I make complementary 
predictions about investor perceptions of economic uncertainty and about the 
                                                            





consequences of investor perceptions of managerial trustworthiness and 
competence.  I do find support for these additional predictions.  In particular, I find 
that investors perceive the greatest increase in economic uncertainty when holding a 
long position and the forecast range widens; conversely, I find that investors 
perceive a decrease in economic uncertainty when holding a short position and the 
forecast range narrows.  In addition, I find that investors’ belief that the manager is 
manipulating earnings is decreasing in perceived managerial trustworthiness, and 
that investors’ willingness to retain the CEO is increasing in perceived managerial 
competence, but, when controlling for perceived competence, investor willingness 
to retain the CEO is not reliably related to perceptions of managerial 
trustworthiness.     
Although I test my hypotheses in the context of management earnings 
forecasts, the theory should be relevant to a number of managerial decisions, 
because there are many such choices that can be interpreted in multiple ways.  For 
example, reductions in segment disclosure could be interpreted as either increasing 
agency costs or reducing proprietary costs (e.g., Berger and Hann 2007).  A second 
example is that an increase in inventory level can be interpreted positively (e.g., as 
an indication of higher future sales) or negatively (e.g., as an indication that 
management cannot adequately control working capital) (Bernard and Stober 1989).  
Other examples include increases in backlog, which could indicate either growing 
demand or an inability to complete projects (Dutta and Trueman 2002), and a 
decrease in market share, which could indicate a either a lack of competitiveness or 





2012).  Overall, in the case of any of these management disclosures, investors’ 
motivated preferences are likely to affect their evaluation of management credibility 
through predictable effects on perceived management competence and/or 
trustworthiness.  Thus, although I focus on one specific disclosure choice, the 
theoretical contribution applies broadly to management disclosure and other 
choices. 
This study makes use of an important and frequent aspect of the financial 
reporting environment—changes in management earnings forecast precision —to 
make several contributions to the accounting and psychology literatures.  First, I 
answer the call of Hirst et al. (2008) to contribute to our understanding of the 
interactions between management earnings forecast antecedents, characteristics, and 
consequences.  Specifically, I examine how changes in MF precision affect 
investors’ perception of managerial trustworthiness and competence.  Second, and 
relatedly, my study has implications for corporate managers.  Executives surveyed 
by Graham et al. (2005) report that they pay a lot of attention to their own personal 
reputation, and that many executives issue earnings guidance to manage market 
expectations.  While my main predictions are not supported, I do find evidence that 
investors’ perception of economic uncertainty is affected by investor position and 
changes in forecast precision.  In addition, I find that, controlling for perceived 
trustworthiness, investors’ decision to retain the CEO is positively related to 
perceived competence.  In contrast, I find that, controlling for perceived 
competence, investors’ decision to retain the CEO is not reliably related to 





The next section discusses the background for the paper and hypothesis 
development.  Section three develops my experimental design.  Section four 






CHAPTER II. BACKGROUND, THEORY, AND HYPOTHESES 
This section discusses three areas of prior literature and theory: management 
earnings forecasts, managerial credibility, and investor preferences.  I follow this 
discussion with development of my hypotheses. 
Management Earnings Forecasts 
 Management earnings forecasts (MF) is important to financial reporting, 
both in terms of the information content provided to capital markets (e.g., Beyer et 
al. 2010), and in terms of importance to the accounting literature (e.g., Hirst et al. 
2008; Healy and Palepu 2001).  My study is closely related to several areas in this 
literature.  I begin this section with a discussion of MF and MF characteristics.  
Then, I discuss prior research on MF precision.   
Background and Earnings Forecast Characteristics 
 Management earnings forecasts are voluntary disclosures containing 
management’s prediction of earnings (King et al. 1990; Hirst et al. 2008).8  Such 
forecasts provide important information to investors;  Beyer et al. (2010) find that 
MF provide about 55% of accounting-based information used by the stock market.  
Specifically, MF explain more quarterly stock return variance than earnings 
announcements, earnings pre-announcements, analysts’ forecasts, and SEC filings 
combined.    
                                                            





 In addition to the choice of whether to issue earnings forecasts (see, e.g., 
Frankel et al. 1995; Hirst et al. 2008; Chen et al. 2011),9 managers who choose to 
issue earnings forecasts have significant discretion in the characteristics of the 
forecast, including forecast form.  Generally, earnings forecasts can take either 
qualitative (i.e., nonnumeric)10 or quantitative formats.  Examples of quantitative 
formats include point, range, minimum estimate, maximum estimate, or hybrids of 
these forms (Hirst et al. 2008; Han and Tan 2007).11   
Prior research finds that managers employ this wide array of forecast 
formats, but the frequency of the alternative MF formats is changing over time.  
Early research on MF form found a wide distribution of formats, including point 
forecasts, range forecasts, and other forecast formats (Baginski et al. 1993; Baginski 
et al. 2004; Hutton et al. 2003).  In contrast, the most recent archival research finds 
that the mix of MF formats shifted markedly toward range formats; by  2010, 87.5% 
of forecasts were in range format, 11.3% were in point format, and only 1.2% were 
in other quantitative or qualitative formats (Ciconte et al. 2013, Table 1).  Next, I 





9 Jensen and Plumlee (2013, Table 1) find 3,717 distinct firms that issue at least one annual MF in the 
period August 2000 – June 2011.  Therefore, firms that issue annual MF constitute a substantial 
minority of all of the publicly-traded companies in the United States.  
10 Examples of qualitative MF are as follows.  “We anticipate EPS to be higher/lower next quarter.”  
“We anticipate EPS to be roughly flat year over year.” 
11 Examples of quantitative MF formats are as follows.  Point: “We anticipate EPS of $1.05.”  Range: 
“We anticipate EPS to be between $1.04 and $1.06.”  Minimum: “We anticipate EPS of at least 
$1.04.”  Maximum: “We anticipate EPS of at most $1.06.”  Hybrid: “We anticipate EPS of $1.05 





The Impact of Management Forecast Precision 
Baginski et al. (1993) study the stock market reactions to various levels of 
MF precision.  Based on theory by Kim and Verrecchia (1991), Baginski et al. 
(1993) find that stock market reactions to signals in MF are increasing in MF 
precision.  In addition, based on a Bayesian belief revision model in Morse et al. 
(1991), Baginski et al. (1993) find that the dispersion of analysts’ ex post earnings 
forecasts increases when the precision of MF signals greater uncertainty than 
impounded by analysts’ prior (ex ante) earnings forecasts.12  Bamber and Cheon 
(1998) examine both the determinants and the consequences of MF precision.  They 
find that managers who are more exposed to legal liability (specifically, in firms 
with large nonaffiliated block shareholders and declining earnings trend) disclose 
less specific MF, and that analysts’ ratings of investor relations are increasing in MF 
precision.  
As part of a larger study on MF precision, Jensen and Plumlee (2013) 
examine the effects of changes in managers’ annual earnings forecasts as the year 
progresses, and find that MF generally become more precise as the yearend earnings 
release approaches.  Jensen and Plumlee (2013) contend that this result indicates 
managers have higher confidence in their estimates as the reporting year progresses.  
Further, Jensen and Plumlee (2013) examine investors’ and analysts’ reactions to 
changes in MF precision as the year progresses.  They find that decreases in MF 
precision as the year progresses have a statistically significant negative impact on 
                                                            
12 In contrast to several of the studies discussed, Pownall et al. (1993) find that MF are less 
informative than earnings announcements.  Also, Pownall et al. (1993) do not find statistically 





both analysts’ earnings forecasts and on stock returns, likely because such decreases 
in precision contrast with the general tendency for managers to be more confident in 
their annual earnings forecasts as the yearend reporting date approaches.  
In addition to this archival literature, a number of experimental studies 
examine the effects of MF precision (Han 2013).  Hirst et al. (1999) examine the 
effects of point versus range MF, both when prior MF were accurate and when prior 
MF were inaccurate.  They find no effect of MF precision on investors’ own EPS 
forecasts; however, they find that investors’ confidence in their own forecasts is 
influenced by MF precision, but only when prior forecast accuracy is high.13  Libby 
et al. (2006) study the effects of MF precision (point, narrow range, wide range) and 
MF bias.  They find evidence for a “range precision effect” whereby analysts 
attribute MF precision to different factors.  In the case of wide range MF, the 
analysts apparently attributed MF bias to temporary, situational factors, such as 
uncertainty in the business environment, with less credit or blame given to 
management (Tan and Lipe 1997).  In the case of narrow range, Libby et al. (2006) 
posit that the analysts made more dispositional attributions because either the 
managers failed to anticipate actual uncertainty in their MF, or they were unable to 
manage the uncertainty.14  
Han and Tan (2010) examine the effects of investment position (long vs. 
short), news valence implied by MF (positive vs. negative) and MF precision (point 
                                                            
13 This finding is also supported by Han and Tan (2007), who find that nonprofessional investors 
have greater confidence in their own earnings estimates when management forecasts explicitly 
provide point estimates.   
14 Libby et al. (2006) do not test these psychological explanations directly (for example, through a 





vs. range).  They find that nonprofessional investors’ position (which, as discussed 
below, influences information processing) affects their own earnings forecasts when 
both news valence implies positive news for the firm and earnings guidance is in 
range format, but not when news valence is negative or earnings guidance is in point 
format.  Han and Tan (2010) posit that investor position does not affect EPS 
forecasts when MF implies negative news for the firm because negative news is 
inherently more credible than positive news (Sansing 1992). In addition, Han and 
Tan (2010) contend that investor position manifests in investors’ EPS forecasts (i.e., 
investors with a long position predict higher EPS than investors with a short 
position) with range MF (and not point MF) because of the greater uncertainty and 
vagueness implied by the range.  
Rupar (2011) examines the effects of forecast form (point vs. range) and 
environmental uncertainty (high vs. low) on perceptions of managerial credibility 
and on investors’ estimated stock prices.  She hypothesizes that when there is a 
misalignment between forecast form and environmental uncertainty (i.e., if MF is in 
point [range] form and environmental uncertainty is high [low]), investors will 
judge management to have relatively low credibility, and thus investors will predict 
relatively low stock valuations.  Rupar’s (2011) results generally confirm these 
predictions.   
In a series of related studies, Du (2009), Du et al. (2011) and Christensen et 
al. (2013) also examine precision formats.  Similar to Han and Tan (2010), Du 
(2009) examines MF precision (point vs. range) and MF favorability (favorable vs. 





companies issuing favorable range MF.  Du et al. (2011) and Christensen et al. 
(2013) examine the “congruity hypothesis,” which predicts that people prefer 
messages (e.g., management forecasts) to be communicated in a form that is 
congruent with the underlying uncertainty regarding the message being 
communicated.   
Specifically, Du et al. (2011) examine point, narrow range, and wide range 
forecasts, along with low and high business uncertainty.  Overall, they find that 
nonprofessional investors prefer narrow range forecasts to both point and wide 
range forecasts; in addition, they find when investors compare forecasts for two 
companies side by side (one point and one range), range forecasts are judged as 
more informative, more accurate and more credible than are point forecasts.  
Furthermore, the preference for narrow range over point forecasts is stronger when 
environmental uncertainty is high than when environmental uncertainty is low.  
Christensen et al. (2013) extend Du et al. (2011) to the financial statements 
themselves—a setting that in practice only uses point estimates (e.g., allowance for 
doubtful accounts = $100).  They find that, when environmental uncertainty is 
relatively high, investors prefer both narrow and wide ranges to point amounts; in 
addition, investors view both narrow and wide ranges as more accurate, more 
credible, and more informative than point amounts, especially during high 
environmental uncertainty.   
My study is similar to Rupar (2011), Du et al. (2011), and Christensen et al. 
(2013) but differs in at least three important ways.  First, Rupar (2011) finds (in her 





measure the same construct (as measured by Cronbach’s alpha) while Du et al. 
(2011) and Christensen et al. (2013) measure credibility as a univariate construct; as 
I discuss below, I predict that (in contrast to prior research) the two components of 
credibility measure separate constructs, at least in the context of changing MF 
precision.  Second, these three studies experimentally manipulate environmental 
uncertainty, while I predict investors will actively construct beliefs about the 
importance of environmental uncertainty to reach their preferred conclusions about 
managerial credibility.  Third, these three studies examine one form versus another 
(e.g., point vs. range), while I examine a common yet little-studied setting—changes 
in MF precision over time.  Thus, my study complements Rupar (2011), Du et al. 
(2011), and Christensen et al. (2013) in that I predict investors actively construct 
judgments about environmental uncertainty to make preferred judgments of the 
components of managerial credibility (trustworthiness and competence), and these 
predictions about the components of credibility contrast with prior research that 
assumes trustworthiness and competence measure the same underlying construct.    
Overall, although several of the aforementioned studies examine the effects 
of various levels of MF precision, very little research examines a common MF 
issue—changes in forecast precision over time.  Managers who provide range 
forecasts can and do vary the width of the range over time (e.g., Ziobro 2011; 
Jensen and Plumlee 2013).  For example, for updated MF as the year progresses, 
Jensen and Plumlee (2013) find that approximately 21 percent of forecasts are less 
precise than the prior forecast, 38 percent are more precise than the prior forecast, 





section, I employ theories of managerial credibility and investor preferences (i.e., 
motivated reasoning) to develop hypotheses about the consequences of this 
important yet unexamined feature of the voluntary disclosure environment.  
Managerial Credibility 
 In this paper, I build on Mercer’s (2004, 2005) definition of credibility in 
that the credibility of a disclosure or manager is determined by investors’ 
perceptions, and is not a “true,” objective (but unobservable) measure of underlying 
credibility.  In this section I discuss two related but distinct concepts: disclosure 
credibility and managerial credibility.  Mercer (2004) delineates four factors that 
influence disclosure credibility: (1) characteristics of the disclosure, including 
precision,15  (2) management’s credibility, (3) the degree of external and internal 
assurance, and (4) management’s situational incentives at the time of the disclosure.  
In the current study, I focus on the first two factors above; in particular, I treat MF 
precision as a cue that investors (sometimes fallibly) use to judge the credibility of 
management, a construct that is not directly observable (Libby 1981, 4-7).  
Therefore, while managerial credibility is a component of disclosure credibility 
(Mercer 2004),  characteristics of a disclosure can also serve as a cue that investors 
use to determine managerial credibility.   
 Mercer (2005), defines managerial credibility as “investors’ beliefs about 
management’s trustworthiness and competence in financial disclosure” (Hovland et 
al. 1953; Giffin 1967).16  An important feature of this definition is that it contains 
                                                            
15 Other disclosure characteristics include venue, timing, amount of supporting information, and 
inherent plausibility (Mercer 2004). 





two components—both competence and trustworthiness; and, at least in theory, one 
of these components could vary while the other remains constant.  For example, two 
managers could both be completely trustworthy but differ in competence.  
Nevertheless, to date, research on managerial credibility treats credibility as a single 
construct, albeit often a composite of several measures (e.g., Mercer 2005; Cianci 
and Kaplan 2010; Rennekamp 2012).17  In this study I separately examine the 
aggregate measure of credibility and the more elemental constructs of 
trustworthiness and competence, and make specific hypotheses about these 
elements.  Below, I discuss some basic findings on MF credibility, followed by a 
discussion of trustworthiness in MF and competence in MF.    
Archival research on MF credibility goes back several decades.  Jennings 
(1987) finds that investor reactions to MF depend on both the news contained in the 
forecast (i.e., the earnings surprise implied by the forecast) and the “believability” 
of the forecast.  That is, “two management projections with the same surprise…but 
with different levels of believability will elicit different responses from investors” 
(Jennings 1987, 91).  Pownall and Waymire (1989) compare the information content 
of MF versus annual earnings announcements, and find that, on average, MF are 
associated with larger price reactions than are earnings announcements, implying 
that MF are generally credible.18     
 The theory and evidence behind managerial trustworthiness in MF is mixed.  
On the one hand, a large stream of literature predicts and finds that MF are, on 
                                                            
17 An exception is Hirst et al. (2007), who use factor analysis to decompose the credibility of the 
disclosure into perceived precision, perceived clarity, and perceived financial reporting quality. 
18 Note that this result is supported by Beyer et al. (2010).  See, e.g., Rogers and Stocken (2005) for 





average, truthful, likely because the accuracy of MF is easily confirmed ex post 
(e.g., Penman 1980; Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Lev and Penman 1990).  On the other 
hand, managers do have incentives to be opportunistic in their MF; for example, 
managers have incentives to issue optimistic MF immediately before selling stock.  
In the other direction, managers have incentives to issue pessimistic MF before 
receiving stock options.  Rogers and Stocken (2005) examine this issue, and find 
that managers issue less truthful MF under conditions where the market is unable to 
detect biased forecasts.   
Relatively little evidence exists on the relation between managerial 
competence and MF, probably because managerial competence is difficult to 
disentangle from overall firm performance (Baik et al. 2011; Demerjian et al. 2012).  
Trueman (1986) develops an analytical model that predicts managers issue forecasts 
to signal their own ability.  Specifically, he theorizes that the issuance of MF affects 
investors’ perceptions of the manager’s ability to anticipate and adapt to the future 
economic environment.  Baik et al. (2011) empirically test Trueman’s (1986) 
theory, and find the likelihood that a manager issues an earnings forecast is 
increasing in CEO ability.19  In addition, Baik et al. (2011) find that MF accuracy 
increases with CEO ability; however, Baik et al. (2011) do not examine MF 
precision.  
In summary, archival evidence suggests that MF are generally truthful, but 
that opportunities exist for opportunistic MF.  In addition, more competent 
                                                            
19 Baik et al. (2011) measure CEO ability three ways: (1) number of press citations for the CEO (e.g., 
Milbourn 2003), (2) data envelopment analysis on measures of firm and managerial efficiency 





managers seem to be more likely to issue forecasts, and, for companies that issue 
forecasts, MF accuracy is increasing in managerial ability.  Nevertheless, the 
relations between perceived managerial trustworthiness, perceived managerial 
competence, and MF precision are unclear.  Because managerial credibility is 
determined by investors’ perception, I contend that investors’ preferences for firm 
performance will affect their interpretations of managerial credibility when MF 
precision changes.  In the next section, I discuss investor preferences and how they 
can affect information processing.  
Investor Preferences 
Building on motivated reasoning research from social psychology (Kunda 
1990), a growing accounting literature documents that people selectively process 
accounting information in a manner that is consistent with their preferences.  
Although much of this work to date is outside of financial accounting (e.g., Bonner 
2008; Tayler 2010), motivated reasoning theory is becoming more influential in the 
study of investors’ interpretation of financial accounting information.  For example, 
Hales (2007) investigates investors’ own earnings forecasts when the investors 
either have a long position (i.e., their investment makes money when the company 
does well) or a short position (i.e., their investment makes money when the 
company does poorly).  He finds that, when the consensus analysts’ forecast implies 
a gain for the investor, the mean investor forecast does not differ between long and 
short positions.  On the other hand, when consensus analysts’ forecast implies a loss 
for the investor, long (short) investors predict relatively high (low) earnings.  





economic incentives to be as accurate in their judgments as possible.  Hales (2007, 
609) notes that his results support research in behavioral finance that shows 
investors to be optimistic (in terms of their own investment performance) (e.g., 
Daniel et al. 1998; Simon and Odean 2001).   
While several studies examine the effects of motivated reasoning on the 
interpretation of information such as analysts’ reports (e.g., Thayer 2011), analysts’ 
forecasts (e.g., Hales 2007), and management’s earnings forecasts (e.g., Han and 
Tan 2010), relatively little research exists regarding how investor preferences affect 
inferences about the preparers of such accounting information.  One study in 
psychology is pertinent to my research question.  Klein and Kunda (1992) contend 
that, when people are motivated to hold particular beliefs about another person, they 
will actively construct justifications to support the desired beliefs, and such 
justifications could be based on their knowledge of the other person in particular or 
on their knowledge of people and the environment in general.  Furthermore, Klein 
and Kunda (1992) posit that, in the process of constructing these justifications, 
people will also construct beliefs about the nature of other people and events that 
will allow them to justify the desired beliefs about the person being judged.   
In one experiment, Klein and Kunda (1992) asked subjects to participate in a 
game with one other “target” person who was previously unknown to them.  For 
half of the participants the target was to be their partner, for the other half their 
opponent.  Participants were given an example of the target’s performance at the 
game which indicated high ability.  Klein and Kunda (1992) assumed that—





partner (opponent) to be good (bad) at the game, even though the target ability was 
the same under all conditions.  Results indicate that participants rated the ability of 
targets intended to be their partners higher than targets intended to be their 
opponents.  Further, in a hypothesized effort to justify these perceptions of target 
ability, participants judged the average person’s ability to be lower (higher) in the 
partner (opponent) condition; that is, judgments of partners’ high ability were 
justified by perceived low average ability and judgments of opponents’ low ability 
were justified by perceived high average ability.  In addition, participants in the 
partner condition responded that luck played a smaller role in the target’s excellent 
performance than did participants in the opponent condition.  
In summary, research in psychology and accounting indicates that people are 
motivated to make judgments that are consistent with their own preferences.  
Further, Klein and Kunda (1992) suggest that, when making judgments about 
another person, people will actively construct beliefs about people in general and 
about external factors such as luck to justify their motivated beliefs about the person 
being judged.  In the next section, I hypothesize that the ambiguity inherent in range 
MF allows investors to justify their motivated beliefs about company management 
through the elements of managerial credibility, trustworthiness and competence.        
Hypotheses 
In the current study I focus on changes in range MF because of its variability 
and because range is by far the most common MF form in recent years (Ciconte et 





using the theories of credibility and motivated reasoning discussed above.  To do so, 
I first summarize prior findings regarding MF in the context of these two theories. 
1) MF precision is a function of a manager’s credibility (competence and 
trustworthiness) and environmental uncertainty (Mercer 2004, 2005; Libby 
et al. 2006). 
2) Trustworthy managers intend for realized earnings to fall within the MF 
range (Jensen and Plumlee 2013). 
3) Holding managerial trustworthiness and environmental uncertainty constant, 
perceived managerial competence is increasing in MF precision (Baginski et 
al. 1993; Mercer 2004; Bamber and Cheon 1998).     
4) Holding managerial trustworthiness and competence constant, MF precision 
is decreasing in environmental uncertainty (Mercer 2004; Libby et al. 2006). 
5) The uncertainty inherent in range MF provides opportunity for investors to 
make motivated justifications for their desired beliefs (Klein and Kunda 
1992; Han and Tan 2010).   
Therefore, consistent with prior research on motivated reasoning, I predict that 
investors will interpret changes in MF precision in accordance with their directional 
preferences.  That is, in terms of firm performance and managerial credibility, I 
predict that investors with a long position will interpret changes in earnings forecast 
precision optimistically while investors with a short position will interpret changes 
in earnings forecast precision pessimistically.  In addition, investors need to be able 
to justify their perceptions of management (Klein and Kunda 1992).  I contend that 





competence—and through perceptions of environmental uncertainty (Libby et al. 
2006).  These general relations are depicted graphically in Figure 1.20     
[Insert Figure 1] 
I first consider the case where management reduces forecast precision (i.e., 
widens the forecast range).  Increased MF range could imply one or more of the 
following: (1) management is of low competence, (2) management is honestly 
attempting to keep realized earnings within the MF range (for whatever reason), or 
(3) there is increased environmental uncertainty.21  I predict investors who are 
motivated to interpret information optimistically (in terms of firm performance) will 
infer that management is honestly attempting to keep realized earnings within the 
MF range (in the face of environmental uncertainty); thus, I expect these investors 
will consider management to be more trustworthy than before.  In the other 
direction, I predict investors who are motivated to interpret the change 
pessimistically (in terms of firm performance) will consider increased MF range an 
indication of low competence.  This discussion leads to my first set of hypotheses, 
stated in alternative form (see Figure 2): 






20 Most accounting literature defines sentiment (i.e., optimism and pessimism) as a bias in the mean 
predicted EPS.  For example, Willis (2001) finds that mutual fund analysts issue optimistically-
biased forecasts of earnings for firms in which they are invested.  In the current study I make 
predictions about the effects of investor sentiment on perceived managerial credibility and its 
components, not on investors’ own EPS forecasts.  Thus, in my paper investor sentiment refers to 
investor desires and beliefs about a firm’s (good or bad) performance, but not necessarily investors’ 
own earnings forecasts.   
21 An additional (but unlikely) possibility is that management is communicating more uncertainty 






Hypothesis 1:  When management earnings forecast  precision  decreases: 
 
H1a:  Investors who hold a long position will perceive a positive 
change in managerial trustworthiness (and therefore overall 
credibility), but investors who hold a short position will not 
perceive a change in managerial trustworthiness. 
 
H1b:  Investors who hold a short position will perceive a negative 
change in managerial competence (and therefore overall 
credibility), but investors who hold a long position will not 
perceive a change in managerial competence. 
 
Next, I consider the case where management increases MF precision (i.e., 
narrows the forecast range).  Decreased MF range could imply one or more of the 
following: (1) increased managerial competence, (2) management is attempting to 
communicate more certainty than they really have (i.e., they are being 
untrustworthy), or (3) there is decreased environmental uncertainty.  I predict 
investors who are motivated to interpret information optimistically (in terms of firm 
performance) will judge management to be more competent than previously.  On the 
other hand, I predict investors who are motivated to view information 
pessimistically (in terms of firm performance) will judge management to be less 
trustworthy than previously (i.e., the manager is communicating more certainty that 
they really have).22  This discussion leads to my second set of hypotheses, stated in 
alternative form (see Figure 3):   




22 An alternative possibility is that pessimistic investors will attribute increased MF precision to 
reduced environmental uncertainty rather than managerial competence (i.e., the investors are giving 







I group my hypotheses by changes in MF precision for ease of exposition.  
However, because I expect differential impacts on perceived trustworthiness and 
competence depending on investor position and changes in MF precision, I 
operationally test my hypotheses based on particular investor judgments.  That is, I 
test H1a and H2b together (testing the effects on judgments of trustworthiness) and 
H1b and H2a together (testing the effects on judgments of competence).  
Additional Predictions 
An interesting result of the hypothesized relations is that, although 
perceptions of competence and trustworthiness differ, both increasing and 
decreasing MF precision increases (decreases) perceived overall credibility for 
investors who are optimistic (pessimistic) about firm performance.  That is, looking 
at credibility as an overall construct (as in prior studies) would reveal only an effect 
of investor sentiment.  If, overall, my hypotheses indicate that optimistic 
(pessimistic) investors will always perceive increased (reduced) credibility, does it 
matter whether the perceived credibility is mediated by trustworthiness or 
Hypothesis 2:  When management earnings forecast precision increases: 
 
H2a:  Investors who hold a long position will perceive a positive 
change in managerial competence (and therefore overall 
credibility), but investors who hold a short position will not 
perceive a change in managerial competence. 
 
H2b:  Investors who hold a short position will perceive a negative 
change in managerial trustworthiness (and therefore overall 
credibility), but investors who hold a long position will not 





competence?  I approach this question using two important contexts in the financial 
reporting environment. 
  First, I examine the consequences of perceived trustworthiness using the 
context of earnings management.  Specifically, I expect that investors’ perception of 
the possibility that management is manipulating earnings is inversely related to 
perceived trustworthiness.  To the extent investors believe management is not 
accurately reporting earnings, managers may be subject to litigation, regardless of 
the protections afforded to forward-looking statements (see, e.g., Beyer et al. 2010, 
for a discussion).   
Second, I examine the consequences of perceived competence using the 
context of the managerial retention decision.  To the extent investors believe firm 
performance is due to high managerial competence (rather than environmental 
factors and luck), they should be more willing to renew the manager’s contract.23  
Thus, my overall experiment gathers investor judgments of management 
competence, trustworthiness, and credibility, along with their consequent judgments 
of potential earnings management, and a vote on extending manager employment.  
These latter decisions and judgments indicate the potential importance of the 
individual factors (i.e., competence and trustworthiness) that comprise overall 




23 Perceived trustworthiness could also be a factor in the managerial retention decision.  As outlined 





CHAPTER III. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD 
Participants 
 Participants are 126 volunteers recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, an 
online service that is becoming a popular source of participants for accounting 
studies (see, e.g., Rennekamp (2012) and Koonce et al. (2013) for examples) in 
addition to many other disciplines (for an overview, see  Mason and Suri (2012) and 
Goodman et al. (2013)).24,25,26  Participants were required to meet all of the 
following criteria before participating in the experiment: (1) they must be located in 
the United States, (2) they must have successfully completed at least 100 previous 
Mechanical Turk tasks, and (3) their Mechanical Turk task approval rate from prior 
tasks must be at least 97 percent.27  Participants reported taking an average of 1.8 
accounting classes and 1.6 finance classes, as well as an having an average of 15.5 
years of total work experience.  The experimental task in this study is of low 
integrative complexity, indicating that these are well-matched participants for my 





24 In total, 147 participants completed the experiment, but 21 are removed from the analysis because 
they provided incorrect responses to attention and manipulation check questions, or were outliers.  
See Table 2 for a detailed reconciliation. 
25 An example of using Amazon Mechanical Turk in Psychology research is Paolacci et al. (2010), 
who recruit participants to replicate some classic studies in the heuristics and biases literature. 
26 The experiment was conducted on August 1, 2013 from approximately 6:59 p.m. until 9:13 p.m., 
Central Daylight Time. 
27 The statistics for these criteria are compiled and maintained by Amazon. 
28 Integrative complexity refers to two factors: (1) the number of distinct characteristics of the 
information set and (2) the need to develop connections between these characteristics in order to 






The procedure of this study is based on Thayer (2011).  Participants assume 
the role of an investor in a hypothetical company.  Participants reviewed basic 
background information about the firm.  To enhance participants’ commitment to 
the task, each participant chose one of two firms in which to invest.  The two firms 
are described so as to be equally attractive.  Although two firms are presented, the 
actual financial information presented during the task is the same for all 
participants; thus this feature is not an experimental manipulation.  Then, 
participants read management’s earnings release for Year 1, along with a 19-cent 
range forecast of Year 2 earnings.  After answering the first set of dependent 
measures (discussed below), participants then read the Year 2 earnings release (with 
actual earnings at the midpoint of the forecasted range), along with a (manipulated) 
range forecast of Year 3 earnings.  Finally, participants answered a second set of 
dependent measures, as well as answered manipulation check and demographic 
questions (see Figure 4).   
[Insert Figure 4] 
Experimental Manipulations 
 I employ a 2 × 2 between-subjects factorial design with random assignment. 
The first factor is investor sentiment, which, following prior literature, I 
operationalize as participants’ taking a long or short position in the stock 
(POSITION: long, short) (Hales 2007; Han and Tan 2010; Thayer 2011).29 The 
                                                            
29 As discussed in Chapter II under “Investor Preferences,” investors holding a “long” position make 
money when the company performs well, while investors holding a “short” position make money 





second factor is change in MF precision (PRECISION: wider, narrower).  Half of 
participants received management earnings forecasts for Year 3 where the forecast 
range is wider (49 cents) than the nineteen-cent forecast range for Year 2 (wider), 
while the other half of participants received a Year 3 earnings forecast range that is 
narrower (three cents) than the nineteen-cent Year 2 forecast range (narrower).     
Compensation 
Participants are compensated (1) for participation, (2) to motivate attention 
to the task (“accuracy” compensation), and (3) to help induce the experimental 
manipulations; thus, there are three sources of compensation.  First, participants 
receive 25 participation points at the beginning of the study.  Second, to motivate 
attention to the task, participants earn up to an additional 25 “accuracy” points if 
actual Year 2/Year 3 earnings equal the participant’s forecast, but one point is 
deducted from these additional 25 points for each cent of difference between the 
actual EPS and the participant’s forecast.  So, the total “accuracy” points awarded to 
each participant equals: 25 - (forecast error for Year 2 + forecast error for Year 3).  
This “accuracy” goal provides an incentive to pay close attention to the 
experimental task (Thayer 2011; Hales 2007). 30  Note that these “accuracy” points 
are the only points that are not predetermined.  
The third source of compensation is intended to help induce the POSITION 
manipulation.  The intuition behind this manipulation is that, despite the incentive to 
make accurate judgments (described above), participants with a long (short) position 
                                                            
30 The earnings forecasts, earnings realizations, and EPS benchmarks (described below) are 
hypothetical.  Thus, this “accuracy” goal is not true accuracy, but rather an attempt to motivate 





should want the company to perform relatively well (poorly).  Following Hales 
(2007), participants with a long position will make (lose) two points for each cent 
that actual EPS beats (misses) a benchmark EPS.  In the other direction, participants 
with a short position will make (lose) two points for each cent that actual EPS 
misses (beats) a benchmark EPS.  This system of payoffs is repeated for both Year 2 
MF/Earnings and Year 3 MF/Earnings.  The “actual” experimental earnings 
realizations are predetermined, so that the actual POSITION compensation is fixed 
at the same level for all participants.  Therefore, following Thayer (2011), I employ 
two experimental design features to induce the POSITION manipulation: (1) as 
discussed above, I allow participants to choose one of two companies in which they 
wish to take a long/short position, and (2) I provide a compensation system in which 
participants are compensated for (good or bad) company performance.       
Overall, the sources of fixed compensation are: (1) 25 points for 
participation, and (2) 12 points based on the firm’s actual performance above (for 
participants with a long position) or below (for participants with a short position) an 
EPS benchmark; variable compensation is a maximum 25 points, based on 
“accuracy.”  At the end of the study, points were converted into U.S. dollars. 
Participants earned an average of $3.32 each and took an average of 16 minutes and 
56 seconds to complete the experiment. 
Dependent Measures 
 My main dependent measures relate to participants’ judgments of the 
components of managerial credibility.  Because my research question relates to the 





to the dependent variables twice, once after viewing the Year 1 release, and again 
after viewing the Year 2 release (see Exhibit 4), and I use change scores as 
dependent measures.  
Credibility Questions from Mercer (2005) 
To enhance comparability to prior research, I first use the exact six 
credibility questions used by Mercer (2005); three of these questions measure 
perceived competence and three measure perceived trustworthiness.  My first 
dependent measure follows:  
 
I believe that management is very competent at providing financial disclosures. 
                                        
                                        
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Completely       Neutral       Completely 
Disagree Agree 
 
The five other questions are: (1) I believe that management has little knowledge of 
the factors involved in providing useful disclosures, (2) I believe that few people are 
as qualified as management to provide useful financial disclosures about the 
company, (3) I believe that management is very trustworthy, (4) I believe that 
management is very honest, and (5) I believe that management may not be truthful 







Additional Dependent Measures 
Note that Mercer (2005) uses measures that are related to managerial 
competence in financial reporting, not managerial competence per se, which is the 
focus of my study.  Thus, I also ask dependent measures related to general 
managerial competence: (1) I believe that management is very competent at running 
the company, (2) I believe that management has little knowledge of the factors 
involved in running the business, and (3) I believe that few people are as qualified 
as management to operate the company.   
Next, I ask participants to respond to several additional questions.  
Consistent with prior studies on MF, I ask participants for their own EPS forecasts, 
as well as their confidence in their forecasts (I do not make hypotheses regarding 
these judgments).  In addition, to determine if participants believe that 
environmental factors are responsible for MF precision, I ask participants to respond 
to the following questions about environmental uncertainty: (1) I believe that 
economic conditions outside of management’s control are affecting company 
performance, and (2) I believe that economic uncertainty is high.  As discussed in 
the background and hypothesis section, I predict investors will actively construct 
justifications to support their desired judgments about management.  Therefore, I do 
not manipulate environmental uncertainty, nor do I include strong assertions about 
environmental uncertainty in the experimental materials in an attempt to hold it 
constant across experimental conditions.  Rather, I predict investors will actively 





importance—to justify desired beliefs about managerial trustworthiness and 
competence.     
As discussed above, I make additional predictions regarding the impact of 
judgments of the components of credibility—trustworthiness and competence—and 
so I collect dependent measures to test these additional predictions.  First, to test the 
effect of perceived trustworthiness, I ask participants to rate the possibility that 
management is manipulating earnings.  Second, to test effects of perceived 
managerial competence, I ask participants to “vote” on whether to retain the CEO.   
Pilot Test 
 Before conducting my main experiment, I performed a pilot test using 100 
participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk.  The pilot test differed from 
the main experiment in two ways.  First, in the pilot test, there was an upward trend 
of earnings from year to year (both implied by the midpoint of the ranges and the 
actual realized earnings); in the main experiment the underlying trend of earnings 
was flat from year to year.  Second, in the pilot test the PRECISION manipulation 
was operationalized by changing from an initial seven-cent range to either a three-
cent range (in the narrower condition) or an eleven-cent range (in the wider 
condition).  The main experiment strengthened the PRECISION manipulation:  an 
initial 19-cent range was changed to a three-cent range (in the narrower condition) 
or a 49-cent range (in the wider condition). 
 Overall, results of the pilot test do not support my hypotheses.  For example, 
results of the pilot test suggest that wider ranges lead to increased ratings of 





for investors assigned to a long position.  I speculate that this unexpected result is 
due to the underlying trend of earnings.  Specifically, when there is a continuous 
upward trend of earnings (and the expected earnings is the midpoint of the range), a 
wider range can imply more “upside” than a narrower range for investors who hold 
a long position.  Conversely, when there is a continuous upward trend of earnings 
(and the expected earnings is the midpoint of the range), a narrower range can imply 
less “downside” than a wider range for investors who hold a short position.  As a 
consequence, for my main experiment I present a flat underlying earnings trend.  In 
addition, I strengthen the PRECISION manipulation with the intention of producing 






CHAPTER IV. RESULTS 
Attention, Manipulation and Randomization Checks 
 Participants responded to five attention check questions unrelated to the 
experiment.  Such questions are recommended by Goodman et al. (2013) as a means 
of providing confidence that participants are carefully reading the experimental 
materials.31  Ten participants provided incorrect responses to two or more of the five 
attention check questions, and so are removed from the sample.    
I also ask the following manipulation check question for PRECISION: 
During this survey, you read two earnings releases, along with two earnings 
forecasts for the upcoming year.  Both earnings forecasts were a range of possible 
earnings.  Which earnings forecast had the wider (larger) range, the first forecast 
(for 2014), or the second forecast (for 2015)? (0—The first forecast was wider than 
the second forecast, 100—The second forecast was wider than the first forecast).  
Asking this manipulation check question on a 101-point scale allows participants to 
indicate uncertainty.  Participants passed the manipulation check if they indicated a 
40 or less in the narrower condition or a 60 or more in the wider condition;32 nine 
                                                            
31 An example attention check question, adapted directly from Goodman et al. (2013, 223), is: 
Research in decision making shows that people, when making decisions, prefer not to pay attention 
and minimize their effort as much as possible.  If you are reading this question and have read all the 
other questions, please select the choice marked "other" below.  Do not select "Predictions of 
investment performance."  Thank you very much for participating and taking the time to read through 
the questions carefully! 
 
What was this study about? 
 a. Predictions of investment performance 
 b. Predictions about the technology industry 
 c. Predictions about the television industry 
 d. Other 
 
32 In other words, participants failed the manipulation check if they responded 41 or higher in the 





participants incorrectly answered the manipulation check question and are not 
included in the analyses.   
Participants also answered questions about their understanding of the 
POSITION manipulation, including the compensation scheme.  To strengthen the 
POSITION manipulation, participants who provided incorrect responses were given 
immediate feedback and allowed to change their responses; accordingly, all 
participants passed the manipulation checks for POSITION.  Analysis of the levels 
(both pretest and posttest) of the nine credibility questions indicates that POSITION 
had a statistically-significant impact on participants’ judgments.  Specifically, 
participants assigned to a long position reported higher perceptions of managerial 
credibility than did investors assigned to a short position (untabulated).  Finally, two 
participants are removed as outliers.33  In total, 147 participants completed the 
experiment but 126 are used in the analyses (see Table 2 for a reconciliation).     
[Insert Table 2] 
Randomization checks indicate that the cells are balanced by age, gender, 
accounting/finance work experience, total work experience, number of finance 
courses taken, and whether participants had ever invested directly in common 
stocks.  Despite random assignment, the experimental conditions are not balanced 
on number of accounting courses taken or whether participants have ever used 
financial statements to evaluate a company’s performance.  Specifically, for number 
of accounting courses, participants in the short/narrower (mean=2.26) and 
                                                            
33 Two participants provided EPS forecasts that were far different from the other participants (e.g., 






long/narrower (mean=2.48) reported having taken more accounting courses than 
participants in the long/wider (mean=1.19) and short/wider (mean=1.30) 
conditions.34  In addition, 81% of participants in the long/narrower and 84% of 
participants in the long/wider condition report having ever used a company’s 
financial statements to evaluate a company’s performance, while 72% of 
participants in the short/narrower and 57% of participants in the short/wider 
conditions report having used a company’s financial statements to evaluate a 
company’s performance.35  Nevertheless, including the number of accounting 
courses taken or whether participants have ever used financial statements to 
evaluate a company’s performance as covariates does not affect my statistical 
conclusions; therefore, I omit these two variables from my analyses.        
Hypothesis Tests 
 As with Mercer (2005), my predictions relate to changes in managerial 
credibility; therefore, my main analysis uses difference scores.  First, I perform tests 
on the underlying constructs of credibility: trustworthiness and competence.  
Correlations between the main dependent measures are presented in Table 3.   
[Insert Table 3] 
Table 4, Panel A indicates a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.83 for the nine credibility 
responses suggests that the measures of competence (both financial reporting and 
                                                            
34 Statistically, conducting an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with number of accounting courses as 
the dependent variable and POSITION and PRECISION (and an interaction term) as independent 
variables results in a statistically-significant main effect of PRECISION.   
35 Statistically, conducting a factorial logistic regression with whether the participant has used a 
company’s financial statements to evaluate its performance as the dependent variable and POSITION 
and PRECISION (and an interaction term) as independent variables results in a statistically-





overall) and trustworthiness are measuring the same construct; this result is not 
consistent with the overall tenor of my predictions.36  In Table 4, Panel B, factor 
analysis on the nine credibility responses indicates that the nine credibility questions 
load on two factors.  Specifically, I find evidence that two questions ([1] I believe 
that few people are as qualified as management to provide useful financial 
disclosures about the company, and [2] I believe that few people are as qualified as 
management to operate the company) measure a different construct from the other 
seven questions.37,38  Although the foregoing analysis suggests competence and 
trustworthiness measure a single credibility construct, based on my ex ante 
predictions I test my hypotheses with the following two composite measures: (1) 
overall competence (i.e., the average of two financial reporting and two operational 
competence questions, omitting the two competence questions that did not load on 
the factor), and (2) trustworthiness (i.e., the average of the three trustworthiness 
questions).     
[Insert Table 4] 
I test both sets of hypotheses using analysis of variance (ANOVA) and 
planned comparisons for my specific predictions.  Specifically, I estimate two 
models, one with changes in trustworthiness as the dependent variable and another 
                                                            
36 Mercer (2005, 731) reports a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.78 for her six main dependent measures. 
37 Analyzing the financial reporting competence and operating competence questions separately also 
suggests that the questions are not measuring the same constructs.  Specifically, as reported in Table 
4, Panel C, the Cronbach’s alpha for the three financial reporting questions is 0.56 and the 
Cronbach’s alpha for the three operating competence questions is only 0.55.  A factor analysis 
reported in Table 4, Panel D suggests that these low coefficients are caused by the third question in 
each grouping. 
38 Note these two questions ask “relative” judgments while the other seven credibility questions ask 
“absolute” judgments.  Therefore, these results suggest that, at least in this situation, participants’ 





with changes in competence as the dependent measure.  Independent variables are 
POSITION and PRECISION (along with an interaction term).   
Hypotheses 1a and 2b would be supported by main effects of both POSTION 
and PRECISION, but no interaction effect in the ANOVA for trustworthiness.  To 
test my specific hypotheses, I use planned comparisons with the following contrast 
weights to test for the predicted changes in perceived trustworthiness: long/narrower 
[0], long/wider [1], short/narrower [-1], and short/wider [0].  Descriptive statistics 
and hypothesis tests are presented in Table 5.  Results do not support H1a or H2b.  
Specifically, there is a statistically-significant main effect of POSTION (p=0.03), 
but in the opposite-from-predicted direction; the main effect of PRECISION is not 
statistically significant (p=0.57).  In addition, the planned comparison is not 
statistically significant (p=0.25).   
[Insert Table 5] 
Hypotheses 1b and 2a would also be supported by main effects of both 
POSTION and PRECISION, but no interaction effect in the ANOVA for 
competence.  To test my specific hypotheses, I use planned comparisons with the 
following contrast weights to test for the predicted changes in perceived 
trustworthiness: long/narrower [1], long/wider [0], short/narrower [0], and 
short/wider [-1].  Descriptive statistics and hypothesis tests are presented in Table 6.  
Results do not support H1a or H2b.  Specifically, there is a statistically-significant 
main effect of POSTION (p=0.03), but in the opposite-from-predicted direction; the 
main effect of PRECISION is not statistically significant (p=0.54).  In addition, the 





[Insert Table 6] 
Next, I perform a test of the effects of POSITION and PRECISION on the 
composite measure of changes in credibility (i.e., using the average of changes in 
seven measures as the dependent variable) using analysis of variance (ANOVA).  
As previously explicated, I expect only a main effect of POSITION for this 
composite test; this is the only effect that could be investigated when, as in prior 
studies, the components of overall credibility are simply added (or averaged) 
together.  Descriptive statistics and the prediction test are tabulated in Table 7.  
Results indicate a statistically-significant main effect of POSITION (p=0.02), but in 
the opposite direction from my prediction.   
[Insert Table 7] 
In addition, I complement my hypothesized findings by performing an 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with changes in investors’ perception that 
environmental factors affected firm performance as the dependent variable.  In 
contrast to the other analyses, I expect a statistically significant interaction, but no 
main effects in this ANOVA, as depicted in Figure 5, Panel E.  Table 8, Panel B 
does not indicate a statistically-significant interaction (p=0.62).  As an additional, 
more specific test, I examine how investors attribute credit or blame for changes in 
forecast precision based on POSTION. Specifically, investors assigned to a short 
position may attribute a narrower range to low economic uncertainty, but not 
attribute a wider forecast range to high economic uncertainty (i.e., management gets 
the “blame” for less precise forecasts, but does not get the “credit” for more precise 





forecast range to high economic uncertainty, but not attribute a narrower forecast 
range to low economic uncertainty (i.e., management does not get the “blame” for 
less precise forecasts, but does get the “credit” for more precise forecasts). I use the 
following contrast code to test this conjecture: long/narrower [-1], long/wider [3], 
short/narrower [-3], and short/wider [1].  Table 8, Panel C reports that this contrast 
is marginally statistically significant (p=0.067).   
[Insert Table 8] 
I further complement my hypotheses by estimating a model with changes in 
investors’ perception that economic uncertainty is high as a dependent variable.  
This test is related to (but not the same as) the test in the paragraph above (tabulated 
in Table 8).  Again, the intuition is that investors assigned to a short position may 
attribute a narrower range to low economic uncertainty, but not attribute a wider 
forecast range to high economic uncertainty (i.e., management gets the “blame” for 
less precise forecasts, but does not get the “credit” for more precise forecasts); 
conversely, investors assigned to a long position may attribute a wider forecast 
range to high economic uncertainty, but not attribute a narrower forecast range to 
low economic uncertainty (i.e., management does not get the “blame” for less 
precise forecasts, but does get the “credit” for more precise forecasts).  Specifically, 
I test the following contrast: long/narrower [-1], long/wider [3], short/narrower [-3], 
and short/wider [1].  Descriptive and inferential statistics are presented in Table 9.  
Results support this conjecture; Table 9, Panel C reports that the contrast is 
statistically significant (p=0.044).        






My additional analyses relate to levels rather than changes in investors’ 
judgments, so I use the post-test measures rather than difference scores in the 
following analyses.  In addition, the independent variables (i.e., perceived 
trustworthiness, competence, and an interaction term) are centered (i.e., each 
observation is deviated from the mean) to facilitate interpretation (Judd et al. 2009, 
144 - 146).39,40  First, I predict investors’ assessment that the manager is 
manipulating earnings is decreasing in perceived trustworthiness.  To test this 
prediction, I conduct a regression with perceived earnings manipulation as the 
dependent variable and perceived trustworthiness as the independent variable, and I 
expect a negative coefficient on perceived trustworthiness.  In addition to 
trustworthiness, I include competence (and a trustworthiness by competence 
interaction term) to ensure the predicted relation obtains when controlling for the 
other variable, and to test whether the predicted manipulate-trustworthiness relation 
is affected by the level of perceived competence.  Results support my prediction.  
Table 10, Panel A indicates that investors’ perception that the manager is 
manipulating earnings is decreasing in perceived trustworthiness (p<0.001), but that 
                                                            
39 Specifically, centering the predictor variables assists interpretation in the following way.  In a 
regression model, the intercept represents the estimated mean of the dependent variable when the 
value of all independent variables is zero.  In addition, the “main effects” of the independent 
variables represent the estimated slope when the value of all other independent variables is zero.  By 
centering the independent variables, the regression intercept represents the estimated mean of the 
dependent variable when all of the independent variables are at their mean.  In addition, the “main 
effects” of the independent variables represent the estimated slope when the value of all other 
independent variables is are at their mean (Judd et al. 2009). 






the perception that the manager is manipulating earnings is not reliably related to 
perceived competence (p=0.12).  
I also predict that investors will be more likely to renew the employment 
contract of managers who they view as being more competent.  To test this 
prediction, I conduct a regression with the decision of whether to renew the 
manager’s contract as the dependent variable and perceived competence as the 
independent variable, and expect a positive coefficient on perceived competence.  In 
addition to competence, I include trustworthiness (and a trustworthiness by 
competence interaction term) to ensure the predicted relation obtains when 
controlling for the other variable, and to test whether the predicted retain-
competence relation is affected by the level of perceived trustworthiness.  Results 
support this prediction.  Table 10, Panel B indicates that investors’ decision of 
whether to retain the CEO is increasing in perceived competence (p=0.0007), but 
that, controlling for perceived competence, the decision of whether to retain the 
CEO is statistically unrelated to perceived trustworthiness (p=0.5198).41  Further, a 
statistically-significant interaction term indicates that the positive relation between 
perceived competence and the decision to retain the manager is increasing in 
perceived trustworthiness (p=0.0235).42   
[Insert Table 10]   
                                                            
41 This result does not imply that the decision to keep the CEO is unrelated to perceived 
trustworthiness; when excluding perceived competence from the model (untabulated), perceived 
trustworthiness is (positively) statistically related to the decision to retain the CEO (p<0.001).   
42 Because there is a statistically-significant interaction, uncentering the independent variables affects 
statistical inferences regarding competence.  Specifically, when the independent variables are not 






CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION 
Summary 
This study examines how changes in management earnings forecast (MF) 
precision combines with investors’ preferences for firm performance to impact 
managerial credibility.  Employing theories of motivated reasoning and managerial 
credibility, I predict that changes in MF precision affect the individual components 
of managerial credibility, but the relation is conditional on investor preferences.  
Overall, results do not support my predictions regarding changes in managerial 
trustworthiness and competence.  Consistent with prior research, I find that the two 
components of managerial credibility (trustworthiness and competence) seem to 
measure the same construct—a result that is inconsistent with my predictions. In 
addition, I find small, positive changes in perceived credibility for investors holding 
a short position, and small, negative changes in perceived credibility for investors 
holding a long position.  Investors holding a long (short) position reported initial 
perceptions of managerial credibility that were relatively high (low).  Therefore, my 
main results may be driven by mean reversion rather than motivated reasoning. 
However, I do find support for my additional predictions.  In particular, I 
find that investors perceive the greatest increase in economic uncertainty when 
holding a long position and the forecast range widens; conversely, I find that 
investors perceive a decrease in economic uncertainty when holding a short position 
and the forecast range narrows.  In addition, I find that investors’ belief that the 
manager is manipulating earnings is decreasing in perceived managerial 





perceived managerial competence; however, when controlling for perceived 
competence, investor willingness to retain the CEO is not reliably related to 
perceptions of managerial trustworthiness.   
Discussion 
Contribution   
These results will interest corporate managers and accounting researchers for 
several reasons.  First, I answer the call of Hirst et al. (2008) to contribute to our 
understanding of the interactions between management earnings forecast 
antecedents, characteristics, and consequences.  Specifically, I examine how 
changes in MF precision affect investors’ perception of managerial trustworthiness 
and competence.  Second, and relatedly, my study has implications for corporate 
managers.  Executives surveyed by Graham et al. (2005) report that they pay a lot of 
attention to their own personal reputation, and that many executives issue earnings 
guidance to manage market expectations.  My results provide further evidence 
regarding how investor perceptions of competence and trustworthiness affect their 
subsequent judgments and decisions. 
The Relation between Perceived Trustworthiness and Competence 
 Prior studies such as Mercer (2005) find that perceived trustworthiness and 
competence measure the same overall construct of credibility.  In this study, I make 
(unsupported) predictions that, in certain situations, perceived trustworthiness and 
competence can vary independently of one another.  However, a third possibility 
exists—does the level of perceived competence depend on the level of perceived 





it is logical that two managers with high trustworthiness could differ in competence 
(e.g., a high trustworthiness/high competence manager vs. a high 
trustworthiness/low competence manager).  However, it may be difficult or 
impossible to discern between managers of high and low competence when 
trustworthiness is low.  Therefore, it is plausible that high trustworthiness is a 
necessary condition (but not a sufficient one) for investors to be able to judge a 
manager to be high competence.  On the other hand, high competence is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for investors to be able to determine managerial 
trustworthiness. 
 If valid, the logic of the above paragraph has implications for the results of 
my paper.  Specifically, in tests of my additional predictions, the statistically-
significant competence by trustworthiness interaction in Table 10, Panel B suggests 
that the effect of perceived competence on investors’ willingness to retain the 
manager is increasing in perceived trustworthiness.  Additionally, in regard to my 
main hypothesis tests, the results for changes in perceived trustworthiness tabulated 
in Table 5, Panel A, may have led to the results of changes in perceived competence 
Tabulated in Table 6, Panel A.  Specifically, investors holding a long position 
perceived a decrease in trustworthiness, which may have, in turn, led to a decrease 
in perceived competence.             
Limitations and Future Directions          
This study is subject to several limitations.  First, it is possible that my 
experimental participants are not good proxies for nonprofessional investors.  While 





investors (especially for tasks of low integrative complexity), there is scant direct 
evidence that participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk are also good 
proxies for nonprofessional investors.  Second, regarding the results of my 
additional tests, perceived managerial competence and trustworthiness are measured 
rather than experimentally manipulated variables. As such, any causal inference 
regarding the effects of trustworthiness and competence on the perception that 
management is manipulating earnings and the decision to retain the CEO may be 
(but is not necessarily) weaker than if competence and trustworthiness were 
experimentally manipulated.   
The results of this study have implications for future research.  For example, 
the results of my main hypothesis tests suggest that participants’ perception of 
managerial trustworthiness and competence may have been affected by mean 
reversion and not reflect motivated reasoning.  Future experiments could address 
this mean reversion by eliciting participants’ initial credibility judgments before the 
investor position manipulation. Furthermore, regarding changes in participants’ 
perception of managerial trustworthiness and competence, my results indicate that 
the absolute magnitudes of changes in these judgments were relatively small 
compared to the standard deviations of the changes in these judgments.  This result 
may have obtained because participants could not access their initial credibility 
judgments when making their final judgments.  Allowing participants to access their 
initial judgments may reduce the noise in participants’ difference scores. 
In addition to the aforementioned adjustments to this study, future research 





earnings were at the midpoint of the range.  Future studies can examine the 
judgmental effects when realized earnings fall in the lower or upper end of the 
forecast range, or, as in Libby et al. (2006), realized earnings fall outside the 
forecast range.  Finally, future research can examine the credibility effects of the 
“inclusiveness” of forecast ranges (i.e., whether forecasted earnings includes all 
income statement items or only selected income statement items).  In particular, 
prior research finds that managers opportunistically report pro-forma (i.e., non-
GAAP) earnings, implying that GAAP earnings are more credible than non-GAAP 
earnings.  However, managers would be able to provide relatively more precise 
forecasts if pro-forma earnings forecasts exclude highly variable items.  Therefore, 
future research could examine whether investors prefer forecasts of relatively wider 
GAAP forecasts or relatively narrower non-GAAP forecasts.       
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APPENDIX A—TABLES AND FIGURES 
 This appendix contains Tables 1 through 10, which provide participant 
demographic information and results of my hypothesis tests.  In addition, this 
appendix contains Figures 1 through 5, which graphically present my predictions 














1. Ever directly invested in common stocks. 69 46 11 126
2. Plan to invest in common stocks in the future. 61 9 56 126
3. Ever used a company's financial statements to evaluate its performance. 92 26 8 126
4. Ever read (or heard) a company's earnings release. 102 12 12 126
Accounting Finance Accounting/Finance Overall Age
Minimum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0
Mean 1.8 1.6 3.4 15.5 35.9
Standard Deviation 2.1 2.3 7.2 11.0 11.5
Median 1.0 1.0 0.0 14.0 34.0
Maximum 12.0 12.0 43.0 50.0 70.0
Number of Participants Reporting  "Zero" 34 43 53 1 n/a
Number of "No Responses" 15 13 22 9 4
Female Male No Response Total
Gender 63 61 2 126
Panel C: Participant Gender
Courses Taken Years' Work Experience
Panel A: Participants' Investing Experience (n=126) Participant Response







TABLE 2—Reconciliation of the Total Sample to the Sample Used for Analysis 
 
   
Condition: Long/Narrower Long/Wider Short/Narrower Short/Wider Total
Total Submissions 37 38 39 39 153
Less: incomplete submissions 0 (4) 0 (2) (6)
Completed Submissions 37 34 39 37 147
Less: participants who failed attention check questions (3) (2) (3) (2) (10)
Less: participants who failed a manipulation check question
a
(3) 0 (6) 0 (9)
Less: outliers
b
0 (1) (1) 0 (2)
Final Sample for Analysis 31 31 29 35 126
a
 To determine whether participants attended to my manipulation, I asked the following question: "During this survey, you read two earnings releases, 
along with two earnings forecasts for the upcoming year.  Both earnings forecasts were a range of possible earnings.   Which earnings forecast had the 
wider (larger) range, the first forecast (for 2014), or the second forecast (for 2015)?"  Participants indicated their responses on a 101-point scale, with 
zero indicating "The first forecast (for 2014) was wider than the second forecast (for 2015)", 50 indicating uncertainty, and 100 indicating "The second 
forecast (for 2015) was wider than the first forecast (for 2014)."  Participants passed the manipulation check if they responded with a 40 or less for the 
narrower condition or a 60 or more for the wider condition.
b
 Two participants provided EPS forcasts that were far different from the other participants (e.g., $5,000,000 for 2014 and $10,000,000 for 2015, in 




TABLE 3—Correlations between Main Dependent Measures 
 
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients (N = 126) [p-value in italics] 
a




3 0.21915 0.17779 1
0.0137 0.0464
Operating Competence
1 0.64282 0.44473 0.27055 1
<.0001 <.0001 0.0022
2 0.42496 0.39372 0.06216 0.47412 1
<.0001 <.0001 0.4893 <.0001
3 0.2454 0.16007 0.23549 0.23474 0.21207 1
0.0056 0.0734 0.0079 0.0081 0.0171
Trustworthiness
1 0.57776 0.47785 0.21889 0.62524 0.3015 0.13842 1
<.0001 <.0001 0.0138 <.0001 0.0006 0.1222
2 0.67518 0.40654 0.27438 0.65326 0.41722 0.27843 0.71994 1
<.0001 <.0001 0.0019 <.0001 <.0001 0.0016 <.0001
3 0.4788 0.29642 0.25544 0.5055 0.47653 0.29186 0.47251 0.62941 1




 Participants responded to nine main dependent measures on a 101-point scale (0 represents total disagreement and 100 represents total agreement).  Three questions relate to financial 
disclosure competence, three questions relate to operating competence, and three questions relate to trustworthiness.  The correlation coefficients above are calculated from difference 
scores (posttest - pretest).
Financial Disclosure Competence Operating Competence Trustworthiness
I believe that management is very competent at providing financial 
          disclosures.
I believe that management has little knowledge of the factors 
          involved in providing useful disclosures. 
b
I believe that few people are as qualified as management to provide 
          useful financial disclosures about the company. 
I believe that management is very competent at running the 
          company.
I believe that management has little knowledge of the factors 
          involved in running the business. 
b
I believe that few people are as qualified as management to  
          operate the company. 
I believe that management is very trustworthy.
I believe that management is very honest.
I believe that management may not be truthful in their financial 





         
TABLE 4—Cronbach’s Alpha and Factor Analysis for the Main Dependent Measures 




Panel B: Factor Pattern for All Nine Dependent Measures b 
Factor Pattern 
Factor1 Factor2 
1 81 * -13 
Fin. Reporting Competence 2 64 * -23 
     3 38   68 * 
1 82 * -8 
Operating Competence 2 62 * -19 
     3 39   66 * 
1 78 * -19 
Trustworthiness 2 86 * -2 
     3 73 * 12   
Panel C: Cronbach's Alpha Calculated Separately for the Three Financial Disclosure Competence, the 








Variables Alpha Alpha Alpha 
Raw 0.560228 0.546670 0.810820 
Standardized 0.572414 0.570606 0.822668 
Panel D: Factor Pattern Calculated Separately for the Three Financial Disclosure Competence, the Three 
Operational Competence, and the Three Trustworthiness Measures b 
Factor Pattern 








1 84 * 81 * 85 * 
Question 2 82 * 80 * 92 * 
3 51 * 57 * 80 * 
  
a Participants responded to three questions related to managerial trustworthiness and six questions related to 
managerial competence on a 101-point scale (0 corresponds to complete disagreement, 100 corresponds to 
complete agreement).  Three of the questions related to operational competence, and three of the questions 
related to financial reporting competence.  The statistics in this table are calculated using difference scores 
(posttest - pretest).  The nine questions are listed in Table 3.  
b The numbers represent the unique variance each factor contributes to the variance of the observed variable.   





TABLE 5—Tests Related to Changes in Perceived Trustworthiness 
Panel A: Mean {Directional Prediction} (Standard Deviation) [number of 
participants]a 
Condition Narrower Wider Row Mean 
Short 2.56 {-} 4.82 {0} 3.80  
(16.76) (16.67) (16.62) 
[29] [35] [64] 
Long -3.53 {0} -2.42 {+} -2.97  
(18.80) (13.29) (16.16) 
[31] [31] [62] 
Column Mean -0.58 1.42 0.47 
(17.95) (15.50) (16.68) 
[60] [66] [126] 
Panel B: Overall ANOVA 
Source of Variance df SS MS F p 
Model 3 1543.09 514.36 1.89 0.135
   POSITION 1 1392.56 1392.56 5.11 0.026
   PRECISION 1 88.67 88.67 0.33 0.569
   POSITION × PRECISION 1 10.34 10.34 0.04 0.846
Error 122 33217.82 272.28 
Panel C: Planned Contrastb 
Contrast    df SS MS F p 
H1a and H2b 1 371.98 371.98 1.37 0.245
  
a Participants responded to three questions related to managerial trustworthiness on a 
101-point scale (0 corresponds to completely untrustworthy, 100 corresponds to 
completely trustworthy).  The statistics in this table are calculated from the mean of the 
difference scores (posttest - pretest) for the responses to the three trustworthiness 
questions.   
b The planned contrast to test H1a and H2b is: long/narrower (0), long/wider (1), 





TABLE 6—Tests Related to Changes in Perceived Competence 
Panel A: Mean {Directional Prediction} (Standard Deviation) [number of 
participants]a 
Condition Narrower Wider Row Mean 
Short 3.59 {0} -0.19 {-} 1.53 
(15.27) (18.11) (16.86) 
[29] [35] [64] 
Long -4.74 {+} -4.48 {0} -4.61 
(18.39) (11.67) (15.27) 
[31] [31] [62] 
Column Mean -0.71 -2.2 -1.49 
(17.33) (15.46) (16.33) 
[60] [66] [126] 
Panel B: Overall ANOVA 
Source of Variance df SS MS F p 
Model 3 1413.54 471.18 1.80 0.151
   POSITION 1 1249.80 1249.80 4.78 0.031
   PRECISION 1 96.82 96.82 0.37 0.544
   POSITION × PRECISION 1 128.36 128.36 0.49 0.485
Error 122 31907.07 261.53 
Panel C: Planned Contrastb 
Contrast    df SS MS F p 
H1b and H2a 1 341.27 341.27 1.30 0.256
  
a Participants responded to six questions related to managerial competence on a 101-point scale (0 
corresponds to totally incompetent, 100 corresponds to completely competent).  Three of the questions 
related to operational competence, and three of the questions related to financial reporting competence.  The 
statistics in this table are calculated from the mean of the difference scores (posttest - pretest) for the 
responses to four of the competence questions.  The responses for two of the competence questions did not 
load on the same factor as the other four responses (see Table 4), and so are omitted from this analysis.   








TABLE 7—Tests Related to Changes in Overall Credibility 
 
 
Panel A: Mean {Directional Prediction} (Standard Deviation) 
[number of participants]a 
Condition Narrower Wider Row Mean 
Short 3.08 {-} 2.32 {-} 2.66 
(14.98) (15.93) (15.39) 
[29] [35] [64] 
Long -4.13 {+} -3.45 {+} -3.79  
(17.20) (11.56) (14.53) 
[31] [31] [62] 
Column Mean -0.65 -0.39 -0.51 
(16.43) (14.24) (15.26) 
[60] [66] [126] 
Panel B: Overall ANOVA 
Source of Variance df SS MS F p 
Model 3 1327.94 442.65 1.94 0.126 
   POSITION 1 1320.21 1320.21 5.80 0.018 
   PRECISION 1 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.989 
   POSITION × PRECISION 1 16.46 16.46 0.07 0.789 
Error 122 27787.95 227.77 
  
a Participants responded to three questions related to managerial trustworthiness and six questions related to 
managerial competence on a 101-point scale (0 corresponds to total disagreement, 100 corresponds to completely 
agreement).  Three of the questions related to operational competence, and three of the questions related to 
financial reporting competence.  The statistics in this table are calculated from the mean of the difference scores 
(posttest - pretest) for the responses to the three trustworthiness questions and four of the competence questions.  
The responses for two of the competence questions did not load on the same factor as the other four responses (see 






TABLE 8—Changes in Perception that Environmental Uncertainty is Affecting 
Company Performance 
Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation) [number of participants]a 
Condition Narrower Wider Row Mean 
Short -3.41 0.74 -1.14 
(19.23) (15.48) (17.27) 
[29] [35] [64] 
Long -3.26 4.00 0.37 
(16.23) (18.95) (17.88) 
[31] [31] [62] 
Column Mean -3.33 2.27 -0.40 
(17.59) (17.14) (17.52) 
[60] [66] [126] 
Panel B: Overall ANOVA 
Source of Variance df SS MS F p 
Model 3 1162.50 387.50 1.27 0.287 
   POSITION 1 91.30 91.30 0.30 0.585 
   PRECISION 1 1021.36 1021.36 3.35 0.070 
   POSITION × PRECISION 1 75.40 75.40 0.25 0.620 
Error 122 37191.66 304.85 
Panel C: Contrastb 
     df SS MS F p 
Contrast 1 1041.06 1041.06 3.41 0.067 
  
a Participants responded to a question asking if they thought environmental uncertainty was  affecting 
company performance (0 corresponds to not at all, 100 corresponds to very much).  The statistics in this 
table are calculated from the mean of the difference scores (posttest - pretest) for the responses to this 
question.   




TABLE 9—Changes in Perception that Economic Uncertainty is High 
 
Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation) [number of participants]a 
Condition Narrower Wider Row Mean 
Short -4.41 2.66 -0.55 
(14.88) (14.68) (15.08) 
[29] [35] [64] 
Long 5.26 6.55 5.90 
(23.49) (18.87) (21.14) 
[31] [31] [62] 
Column Mean 0.58 4.48 2.63 
(20.24) (16.76) (18.52) 
[60] [66] [126] 
Panel B: Overall ANOVA 
Source of Variance df SS MS F p 
Model 3 2128.94 709.65 2.12 0.101 
   POSITION 1 1442.01 1442.01 4.32 0.040 
   PRECISION 1 548.02 548.02 1.64 0.203 
   POSITION × PRECISION 1 261.94 261.94 0.78 0.378 
Error 122 40762.53 334.12 
Panel C: Contrastb 
     df SS MS F p 
Contrast 1 1386.58 1386.58 4.15 0.044 
  
a Participants responded to a question asking if they thought economic uncertainty was  high (0 corresponds 
to not at all, 100 corresponds to very much).  The statistics in this table are calculated from the mean of the 
difference scores (posttest - pretest) for the responses to this question.   





TABLE 10—Tests of Additional Predictions 
Panel A: Regression Results for MANIPULATE = β0 + β1 × TRUSTWORTHINESS +  
β2 × COMPETENCE + β3 × TRUSTWORTHINESS × COMPETENCE + ε 
b 
Independent Variable Estimate   Std. Error   t-value   p 
Intercept 39.6383 1.92317 20.61 <.0001 
COMPETENCE -0.2059 0.13263 -1.55 0.1231 
TRUSTWORTHINESS -0.6224 0.11476 -5.42 <.0001 
COMPETENCE × TRUSTWORTHINESS 0.0028 0.00410 0.67 0.5015 
Model F-Statistic 36.76 <.0001 
Adj. R2 0.4619 
N 126 
Panel B: Regression Results for RETAIN = β0 + β1 × TRUSTWORTHINESS +  
β2 × COMPETENCE + β3 × TRUSTWORTHINESS × COMPETENCE + ε 
b 
Independent Variable Estimate   Std. Error   t-value   p 
Intercept 59.1542 2.66715 22.18 
 
<.0001 
COMPETENCE 0.6366 0.18394 3.46 0.0007 
TRUSTWORTHINESS 0.1028 0.15916 0.65 0.5198 
COMPETENCE × TRUSTWORTHINESS 0.0130 0.00568 2.29 0.0235 
Model F-Statistic 15.76 <.0001 
Adj. R2 0.2616 
N 126 
a Participants responded to a question asking whether they believed company management was manipulating earnings 
on a 101-point scale (0 corresponds to a strong belief that management is not manipulating earnings, 100 corresponds 
to a strong belief that management is manipulating earnings).  Independent variables are perceived competence and 
trustworthiness as defined in Tables 5 and 6, respectively.  This regression uses post-test measures (rather than the 
difference scores used in Tables 4 - 9).  The independent variables are centered.  Because there is no statistically-
significant interaction, inferences regarding the coefficients are not affected by uncentering the independent variables.  
b Participants responded to a question asking whether the CEO should be retained on a 101-point scale (0 corresponds 
to absolutely replace the CEO, 100 corresponds to absolutely keep the CEO).  Independent variables are perceived 
competence and trustworthiness as defined in Tables 5 and 6, respectively.  This regression uses post-test measures 
(rather than the difference scores used in Tables 4 - 9).   The independent variables are centered.  Because the 
interaction term is statistically significant, the estimated coefficients change when the independent measures are 
uncentered.  Specifically, the estimated coefficient for COMPETENCE changes from statistically significantly 
positive when the independent measures are centered (tabulated above) to not statistically significantly different from 
zero when uncentered (untabulated).   
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FIGURE 1—Conceptual Model of the Relations between Change in Management Earnings Forecast Precision, Investors’ 
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a  I employ a 2 × 2 between-subjects factorial design with random assignment. The first factor is investor sentiment, which, following prior 
literature, I operationalize as participants’ taking a long or short position in the stock (POSITION: long, short) (Hales 2007; Han and Tan 2010; 
Thayer 2011). The second factor is change in MF precision (PRECISION: wider, narrower).  Half of participants receive management earnings 
forecasts for Year 3 where the forecast range is wider (49 cents) than the forecast range for Year 2 (wider), while the other half of participants 
receive a Year 3 earnings forecast range that is narrower (three cents) than the Year 2 forecast range (narrower). 
b To enhance participants’ commitment to the task, each participant chooses one of two firms in which to invest.  The two firms are described so 
as to be equally attractive.  Although two firms are presented, the actual financial information presented during the task is the same for all 
participants; thus, this feature is not an experimental manipulation. 
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FIGURE 5—Experimental Design and Hypothesized Results 
 
Panel A:  Experimental design 
 
  PRECISION 
  Wider Narrower 
POSITION Long 1 2 
 Short 3 4 
 
 
Panel B:  Change in perceived trustworthiness (H1a and H2b) 
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Panel C:  Change in perceived competence (H1b and H2a) 
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Panel D:  Change in perceived overall credibility 
 
  PRECISION 
  Wider Narrower 
POSITION  Long + + 
























Panel E:  Change in the perception that environmental factors are 
responsible for firm performance 
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Thank you for your participation 
 
In the following pages, you will have the opportunity to 
make an investment decision.  During this process, you 
will have the chance to earn points that will be converted 
to dollars I will pay to you at the completion of the study 
(in approximately two weeks).   
 
 Participation Points: you will earn 25 points for 
completing the materials.  This is to thank you for 
your time. 
 
 Accuracy Points: You can earn up to an additional 
25 points for accurately forecasting earnings per 
share (described later).  This is to encourage you to 
focus on the materials and information. 
 
 Investment Benchmark: You may also earn or 
lose up to 25 points, depending on how your chosen 
investment performs.  
 
At the end, points will be converted into dollars.  Overall, 






After researching the industrial supplies industry, you concluded 
that two firms in the industry are [overvalued/undervalued].  
Based on your research, you would like to take a [short/long] 
position in one of these two stocks. 
Note:  A [short/long] investment position is like making a prediction and 
bet that the stock price will [decrease/increase].  In other words, 
when you take a [short/long] position, you hope that the company 
performs [poorly/well].  Your investment will make money when the 
company performs [poorly/well]. 
After comparing the two firms, you have decided to make your 
decision based on the following information: 
 
Except for the items above, all other information regarding the 
companies, including their stock prices, are very similar to each 
other. 
Please remember that part of your total points depends on how 
the company performs.  Now, please choose the firm in which 
you would like to take a [short/long] position.  Remember that 
when you take a [short/long] position, this means your investment 
will do well when the firm performs [poorly/well.] 
FIRM Y    FIRM Z 
Last three years' growth rates for revenue and operating income Last three years' growth rates for revenue and operating income
2012 2011 2010 2012 2011 2010
Revenue 1.0% 11.1% 15.3% Revenue 8.3% 14.2% 17.2%
Operating Income 4.9% 4.4% 22.9% Operating Income 9.5% 8.5% 25.6%
Last three years' operating profit margin Last three years' operating profit margin
Operating profit as a % of Sales 21.7% 20.9% 22.2% Operating profit as a % of Sales 14.0% 14.7% 14.0%























EARNINGS RELEASE FOR YEAR 1 (2013) 
 
You decided to take a [short/long] position in [Firm Y/Firm Z].  
Below is [Firm Y’s/Firm Z’s] earnings press release for the year 
2013. 
 
For Immediate Release 
[FIRM Y/FIRM Z] REPORTS 2013 EARNINGS OF $1.27 
PER SHARE 
Management Expects 2014 EPS in the range of $1.18 - $1.36 
DALLAS, Texas—(Business Wire)—This morning [Firm Y/Firm Z] reported 
earnings for the year 2013 of $1.27 per share.   
“We are pleased to have achieved solid earnings in 2013,” said CEO Irwin 
Thaler.  “Looking to next year, we feel confident that we can achieve our 
earnings target for 2014, in the range of $1.18 to $1.36 per share.”  
 
NOTE:  During the remainder of this survey, you will be asked 
several questions about company performance and about your 
opinion of company management.  Several questions are 




Please note that, although there appear to be many questions, 









Based on your reading of the earnings release, please answer 
the following questions below.  For each question, please mark 
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Completely          Neutral      Completely 
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5) I believe that management is very honest. 
                                               
                                                                   
                                                                   
  0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100   
                                               
Completely          Neutral      Completely 
Disagree                                  Agree 
   
6) I believe that management may not be truthful in their financial disclosures. 
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13) Overall, how confident are you in your judgments above? 
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VOTE ON MANAGEMENT RETENTION 
 
[Long Investors: Shareholders are entitled to vote on whether 
to retain the CEO each year.  Please provide your opinion 
about whether the CEO should be retained for the next year.] 
[Short Investors: Shareholders are entitled to vote on whether 
to retain the CEO each year.  Although you are not a 
shareholder (you are betting against the company), please 
provide your opinion about whether the CEO should be 
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EARNINGS BENCHMARK FOR YEAR 2 (2014) 
 
Recall that you decided to take a [short/long] position in [Firm 
Y/Firm Z].  That is, you hope that the company performs 
[poorly/well]. 
In this study, to simulate how the firm’s performance would affect 
an investor with a position like yours, you will earn two extra 
points (remember these will be converted to dollars paid to you) 
for every cent that the company’s 2014 earnings per share is 
[below $1.33/above $1.21].  Also, for each cent that the 
company’s 2014 earnings per share is [above $1.33/below 
$1.21] you lose two of these payment points. 
Please see the examples in the table below: 
 
Actual Earnings Points Explanation 
Three cents above benchmark 6 3 cents × 2 points = 6 points total
One cent below benchmark -2 -1 cent × 2 points = -2 points total
 
To ensure that you understand how this works, please answer 
the following questions.  Remember that your benchmark 
is [$1.33/1.21]. 
1) If the company’s actual 2014 earnings per share is [$1.22/$1.30], then I 
would: 
 a. Earn two points 
 b. Lose two points 
 c. Earn six points 
 d. Lose six points 
 
2) If the company’s actual 2014 earnings per share is [$1.24/$1.32, then I 
would: 
 a. Earn two points 
 b. Lose two points 
 c. Earn six points 




EARNINGS PER SHARE (EPS) FORECAST FOR YEAR 2 
(2014) 
Now that you have read management’s earnings forecast for the 
next year (2014), please make your own prediction of what you 
think EPS will be for [Firm Y/Firm Z]. 
Recall that you will earn points for accurately predicting EPS so 
you want to make the best estimate you can.  To calculate how 
many points you get for this, I will start you with 25 accuracy 
points, and then for each penny that your prediction differs from 
the actual EPS, you will lose two points from these 25 accuracy 
points.  So you want to be as accurate as you can.  (Note: total 
accuracy points cannot go below zero). 
 
You may read the earning press release again if you wish. 
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EARNINGS RELEASE FOR YEAR 2 (2014) 
 
Recall that you decided to take a [short/long] position in [Firm 
Y/Firm Z] and that this means you hope that the company 
performs [poorly/well].  Below is [Firm Y’s/Firm Z’s] earnings 
press release for the year 2014. 
 
For Immediate Release 
FIRM Y/FIRM Z REPORTS 2014 EARNINGS OF $1.27 
PER SHARE 
Management Expects 2015 EPS in the range of $1.26 - $1.28 
[Management Expects 2015 EPS in the range of $1.03 - $1.51] 
 
DALLAS, Texas—(Business Wire)—This morning [Firm Y/Firm Z] reported 
earnings for the year 2014 of $1.27 per share.   
“Once again we had another good year,” said CEO Irwin Thaler.  “Looking 
forward, due to a number of changes in the upcoming year, we decided to 
[narrow/widen] our EPS range for 2015 when compared to 2014.  Thus, we 









Based on your reading of the earnings press release, please 
answer the following questions below.  For each question, 
please mark your response with a slash (/) on the line 
provided.   
1) I believe that management is very competent at providing financial 
disclosures.   
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3) I believe that management is very trustworthy. 
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5) I believe that management is very honest. 
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6) I believe that management may not be truthful in their financial disclosures. 
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13) Overall, how confident are you in your judgments above? 
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VOTE ON MANAGEMENT RETENTION 
 
[Long Investors: Shareholders are entitled to vote on whether 
to retain the CEO each year.  Please provide your opinion 
about whether the CEO should be retained for the next year.] 
[Short Investors: Shareholders are entitled to vote on whether 
to retain the CEO each year.  Although you are not a 
shareholder (you are betting against the company), please 
provide your opinion about whether the CEO should be 





                                               
                                                                   
                                                                   
  0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100   




        Neutral      Absolutely 
Keep the CEO 





EARNINGS BENCHMARK FOR YEAR 3 (2015) 
Recall that you decided to take a [short/long] position in [Firm 
Y/Firm Z].  That is, you hope that the company performs 
[poorly/well]. 
In this study, to simulate how the firm’s performance would affect 
an investor with a position like yours, you will earn two extra 
points (remember these will be converted to dollars paid to you) 
for every cent that the company’s 2014 earnings per share is 
[below $1.33/above $1.21].  Also, for each cent that the 
company’s 2015 earnings per share is [above $1.33/below 
$1.21] you lose two of these payment points. 
Please see the examples in the table below: 
 
Actual Earnings Points Explanation 
Three cents above benchmark 6 3 cents × 2 points = 6 points total
One cent below benchmark -2 -1 cent × 2 points = -2 points total
 
 
To ensure that you understand how this works, please answer 
the following questions.  Remember that your benchmark 
is [$1.33/$1.21]. 
1) If the company’s actual 2015 earnings per share is [$1.22/$1.30], then I 
would: 
 a. Earn two points 
 b. Lose two points 
 c. Earn six points 
 d. Lose six points 
 
2) If the company’s actual 2015 earnings per share is [$1.24/$1.30], then I 
would: 
 a. Earn two points 
 b. Lose two points 
 c. Earn six points 





EARNINGS PER SHARE (EPS) FORECAST FOR YEAR 3 
(2015) 
Now that you have read management’s earnings forecast for the 
next year (2015), please make your own prediction of what you 
think EPS will be for Firm Y/Firm Z. 
Recall that you will earn points for accurately predicting EPS so 
you want to make the best estimate you can.  To calculate how 
many points you get for this, I will start you with 25 accuracy 
points, and then for each penny that your prediction differs from 
the actual EPS, you will lose two points from these 25 accuracy 
points.  So you want to be as accurate as you can.  (Note: total 
accuracy points cannot go below zero). 
 
You may read the earning press release again if you wish. 
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[PRIOR MATERIALS INACCESSABLE] 
ALMOST DONE! 
 
The next section contains general questions about 
your investing experience. 
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        Don’t prefer one over 
another 
    Prefer 
relatively 
wide range 
 
 
7) Have you ever used a company’s financial statements to evaluate its 
performance (circle one)? 
1. Yes 
2. Uncertain 
3. No 
4. Prefer not to say 
 
 
 
 
 
  
96 
 
8) Have you ever read (or heard) a company’s earnings press release (circle one)? 
1. Yes 
2. Uncertain 
3. No 
4. Prefer not to say 
 
9) How many total undergraduate and graduate accounting courses have you 
taken, including the courses in which you are currently enrolled? 
 
Approximately XXXXXX total accounting courses 
 
10) How many total undergraduate and graduate finance courses have you taken, 
including the courses in which you are currently enrolled? 
Approximately XXXXXX total finance courses 
 
11) How many years of total work experience do you have? 
Approximately XXXXXX years 
 
12) How many years of total finance and accounting work experience do you have? 
Approximately XXXXXX years 
 
13) Are you a Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA), and if so, for how many years? 
Approximately XXXXXX years 
 
14) Are you a Certified Public Accountant (CPA), and if so, for how many years? 
Approximately XXXXXX years 
 
15) What is your age (optional)? 
 XXXXXX years old 
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16) What is your gender (optional) (circle one)? 
1. Female 
2. Male 
3. Prefer not to say 
 
 
